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BACKGROUND AND OVERVIEW
MEXICO AND THE UNITED STATES: COMMON
FRONTIER-UNCOMMON RELATIONSHIP
Michael W. Gordon*
No two nations with disparate cultures, economy prosperity, and
global power share as long a border as Mexico and the United
States. The antecedents of these neighbors, Spain and England,
met in hostility four centuries ago, at a time of comparative equal-
ity in sixteenth century prosperity and power. But Mexico and the
United States, two principal Western hemispheric progeny of Spain
and England, would by a combination of inheritance and choice,
reach a gap in development of disturbing proportions.
These two nations are destined irrevocably to share a seemingly
inexhaustible, and frequently exhausting frontier. Until this cen-
tury, these nations have not directly faced one another to discuss
and resolve principal conflicts affecting their political, economic,
and social development. In this century, however, and particularly
in the four decades since World War II, they have faced each
other, discussed, and in some cases, resolved issues of mutual con-
cern. This twentieth century bilateralism, however, has been con-
fined largely to issues not related either to global security or eco-
nomic development. In those areas, each has sought solutions in
multilateral fora, where regretfully, each usually sit on opposite
sides of large and crowded bargaining tables.
Multilateral negotiations are crucial to development, but ought
not totally replace bilateralism. Multilateralism should not be
viewed as the only effective mode of achieving economic growth.
The fashionable view of the history of Mexican-U.S. relations has
led Mexico to be wary of bilateral trade dealings with the United
States, when made without the protective cloak of colleagues of the
Third World, and has caused the United States to deal with Mex-
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ico with condescension. This is an unworthy historical legacy. And
is a legacy based on distorted perceptions of the historical
relationship.
The United States shares a long frontier with both Canada and
Mexico. But with Canada it also shares a cultural and historical
affinity. This does not suggest that it always deals effectively with
Canada. The United States places a mirror along the border with
Canada and then believes it is looking into that nation. It expects
Canada to reflect U.S. characteristics and aspirations. The relation-
ships succeeds partly because the reality is much like the reflection.
The United States does not place a mirror on the Mexican border.
Nor does it expect Mexicans to look like Americans. It places car-
icatures rather than mirrors on the Mexican border, caricatures
which represent mythical stereotypes.1 They are stereotypes learned
years ago in Saturday morning movies and comic books, and too
often reinforced in grammar and secondary school texts. The
United States does not see Canadians as they really are, but as the
United States sees itself. The United States does not see Mexicans
as they really are, but as the United States has fictionalized them.
Failure to view one another as we really are has established an ob-
stacle to possessing a very clear understanding of each others
desires and needs, and thus an obstacle to the kind of harmonious
relations these two nations should share.
Prior to the turn of the century, nearly every relationship with
Mexico was the consequence of maintaining and improving a deli-
cate balance of power between the United States and Europe. Man-
ifest Destiny of the United States was intended more to eliminate
European power in this hemisphere, than to acquire additional ter-
ritory. John Quincy Adams noted in a cabinet meeting in 1819 that
it was "a physical, moral, and political absurdity," that the Euro-
pean colonies in this hemisphere "should exist permanently conta-
gious to a great, powerful and rapidly-growing nation."2 The
United States never used this doctrine, nor that of Monroe, to take
by force territory which was substantially occupied and effectively
governed by that nation from any independent nation of this hemi-
sphere. Mexico has often overlooked this, believing (or preferring to
believe) that the United States was dealing directly on a North-
South basis and manifesting imperialist ambitions over its southerly
1. See Gordon, Mythical Stereotypes Dealing with Mexico as a Lawyer, 37 J. LEGAL
EDUC. (1987).
2. 2 THE WRITINGS OF JOHN QUINCY ADAMS 372-73 (W. Ford ed. 1913).
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The United States did not seek more territory as territory, but
because it refused to share this continent with European powers.
The U.S. acquired some territory in its westward expansion, by
purchase or occupation, which did not affect Mexican-U.S. rela-
tions. And it acquired Texas for an aggregate of complex reasons
including the politics of slavery. Without understanding the past
and placing to rest real and imagined wounds, there is little reason
to foresee mutual progress in the development of a more positive
relationship.
The idea that the losses Mexico views it has suffered from its
adhesion to the United States were not always intentional, but the
detritus of East-West relationships, is supported by the occasionally
volatile relations of these two nations. Voltaire once stated that his-
tory is a myth rewritten by each generation. It would help both
these nations to rewrite it next with less myth and more veracity.
The United States has long been relationally preoccupied along
latitudinal lines running East and West. "The East-West opposition
has always been considered basic and primordial," writes Octavio
Paz, "it alludes to the movement of the sun, and is therefore an
image of the direction and meaning of our living and dying." 3 The
Monroe Doctrine was an East-West expression. It spoke to Europe.
The nations of Latin America, allegedly beneficiaries of the Doc-
trine, approved its message. But when five of those nations, includ-
ing Mexico, suggested it should be followed by treaties of alliance
or assistance against intervention, the United States declined. The
Doctrine did not contemplate North-South alliances because it was
a Doctrine not of North-South confederation, but of East-West
power symmetry. John Quincy Adams later stated that "There is
no community of interest or of principles between North and South
America.' 4 Washington's and Jefferson's warnings against foreign
alliances were directed at Old World despotism. America ap-
plauded freedom and recognized independence in Latin America
less for its value to the inhabitants of those nations than for the
assurances it brought to the United States that European domina-
tion in this hemisphere was being ceded to the United States.
Mexican independence did not generate a treaty of alliance with
the United States. The first treaty, in 1839, determined claims of
United States citizens who suffered property losses in Mexico dur-
3. 0. Paz, Reflections, The New Yorker, Sept. 17, 1979.
4. See 2 THE WRITINGS OF JOHN QUINCY ADAMS, supra note 2.
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ing the years of conflict while Mexico fought for freedom.6 The day
that the United States acquired, and Mexico lost, the land that now
comprises six southwestern states has become a second Noche
Triste. The United States does not dwell on its losses as do Mexi-
cans. But Americans do not understand the meaning of the past to
Mexicans. Those territorial losses are parts of the Mexican past,
and the past, as Carlos Fuentes suggests, "must be dealt with per-
petually, because redemption is to be found more in the origin than
the future."6 Ironically, the past might have involved a much
greater loss were Mexicans to understand the dynamics of United
States history.
The territorial issue was partly a conflict over differing views of
what constituted adequate occupation to justify sovereignty. To the
United States, sovereignty demanded substantial occupation, cer-
tainly more than the incidental occupation of the disputed territory.
But the issue was not settled by notions of international law, but
rather by the territorial psyche of President Polk-his fear that
what the United States did not absorb in the West, would fall prey
to the British. Only a few decades earlier, the United States had
narrowly emerged from a bloody revolution with England. The con-
flict with Mexico was the product of a feared further confrontation
along the East-West axis, not the product of relations, good or bad,
running North-South.
By signing the Treaty of Guadelupe Hidalgo in 1848,1 and the
Gadsden Purchase8 in 1853, Mexico had in three treaties in fifteen
years agreed to demands from the North under threat of more seri-
ous losses. The threat was expressed by what nearly became a
fourth treaty in 1860.9 It did not become a fourth treaty only be-
cause the U.S. Senate rejected it. It would have allowed the United
States railroad rights of way to Mazatlan from the lower Rio
Grande, and to Guaymas from Nogales, and the right to intervene
to protect U.S. citizens. The treaty was not supported by Northern
senators who feared President Buchanan was attempting to extend
slave territory. If that treaty had received the advice and consent of
5. Convention for the adjustment of claims of citizens of the United States of
America upon the Government of the Mexican Republic, April 11, 1839, United States-
Mexico, 8 Stat. 256, T.S. No. 205C.
6. Fuentes, Dealing with the Damn Yankee, TOWN & COUNTRY 276 (Nov. 1980).
7. Treaty of Peace Friendship, Limits and Settlement with the Republic of Mexico,
Feb. 2, 1848, United States-Mexico, 9 Stat. 922, T.S. No. 207.
8. Treaty with Mexico, Dec. 30, 1853, United States-Mexico, 10 Stat. 1031, T.S. No.
208.
9. See J. PRATT, A HISTORY OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY 154 (2d ed. 1955).
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the Senate-given the provisions of the Gadsden Purchase, which
granted the United States the right to establish any means of
transit across the Isthmus of Tehuantepec and also the right to pro-
tect U.S. citizens (provisions surrendered in 1939)- Mexico might
be a very different nation today.
The U.S. interest in Mexico, mainly as it affected the U.S. power
balance with Europe is reflected in the next major tension, the
1860s French intervention which placed Maximilian on the throne.
When U.S. attention was again directed southward after the Civil
War, Secretary of State Seward urged the French to leave, not by
any dialogue with Mexico, but directly with Napoleon in Paris. The
United States insisted that Mexico remain free of European inter-
ference. The issue to the United States was again East-West, not
North-South. Had France not withdrawn, Grant and Sheridan,
their military skills intact from the U.S. Civil War, were prepared
to lead troops to occupy parts of Mexico. But the French withdrew.
The Mexican-U.S. frontier would remain little changed in the
years to come. The boundary today is less the product of a U.S.-
Mexican territorial struggle than the end result of the United
States establishing minimum acceptable boundaries in largely un-
governed areas which promoted the principle of the Monroe Doc-
trine. The United States has been repeatedly castigated by Mexico
for the loss of half of its former territory. That loss never would
have occurred had Spain populated the territory more substantially,
which would have left Mexico with the legacy of a capability of
thwarting the efforts of British and Continental powers to further
colonize this hemisphere. These nineteenth century conflicts be-
tween Mexico and the United States set a bitter tone for relations
in this century.
The nineteenth century view of Mexico as a pliable third party in
the latitudinal vortex of world events contributed to the contempo-
rary U.S. image of the Mexican as a person of modest capacity for
self-government. Lack of Mexican participation in world events was
first equated to lack of world power, then lack of national capacity,
and finally lack of individual capacity. That lack of individual ca-
pacity is now related less to those events than to characterized
images and mythical stereotypes of the Mexican, created and rein-
forced in our educational system. Americans expect Mexicans to
fail and these expectations have found a home in part of the Mexi-
can self-image. They contribute to Mexico's underdevelopment.
Lawrence Harison has titled his recent book, "Underdevelopment is
19871
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a State of Mind."1 His premise, that learned, not inherited, cul-
tural attributes in Latin America have retarded development, mer-
its careful reflection by all Latin Americans, particularly those who
have long thrived on dependency theory. The idea was that Latin
American underdevelopment bears scars of causation solely from
external flogging. There has not been much evidence of self blame
when underdevelopment causation has been examined in the do-
mestic literature of Mexico. However, a cultural characteristic of
Latin America, noted by the French author Jean-Francois Revel,
has been an absence of self-criticism."
In this century the basis of relations with Mexico changed. Some
conflicts were, as before, the fall-out from the East-West power
balance. However, the United States did begin to deal directly with
Mexico. The issues continued to involve property. This time, how-
ever, the issue did not involve property as territory within our per-
ceived frontiers, but the property of U.S. nationals in Mexico. The
government of Porfirio Diaz welcomed foreign investment. Much of
this investment was French, British, and Spanish. United States'
domination occurred after the First World War. Differing percep-
tions regarding foreign investment remain a cause of tension for the
two nations in the final years of this century. Other issues causing
tension include the flow of persons and property, and to some de-
gree persons as property, north and south across the border.
Unlike the relationship of the United States with every other
Latin American nation, nearly ever tension with Mexico is linked to
adjacency. These two nations must be able to deal effectively with
each other because they are neighbors, acknowledging that it is be-
ing a neighbor that created a considerable part of the tension.
What distinguishes these contemporary issues from nineteenth
century conflicts is that they are not, with few exceptions, East-
West dominated. They are direct North-South, Mexico-U.S. issues.
However unable the two nations are to resolve them, at least the
nations are facing each other when the conflicts are discussed.
There is an additional favorable element which could arise only af-
ter the United States did begin to deal with Mexico directly. It is
an element of humanity, perhaps not so much dependence on a sin-
cere concern for the well-being of Mexicans, as it is a desire that
Mexico achieve a sufficient level of economic success, that tensions
between the two nations diminish. What both nations must hope for
10. L. HARISON. UNDERDEVELOPMENT IS A STATE OF MIND (1985).
II. J. Revel, The Trouble in Latin America 47 COMMENTARY, 47 (Feb. 1979).
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is that humanitarianism will replace property as the apogee of na-
tional interchange, and that comprehension will replace condescen-
sion as the apogee of this humanitarian focus.
President Wilson was the first to act with this sincerity, by his
rejection of Huerta as a successor to the assassinated Madero. Al-
though Wilson interfered with a sovereign nation by the occupation
of Veracruz, it was done, as Wilson stated, because "our sincere
desire was nothing else than to assist you to get rid of a man who
was making the settlement of your affairs for the time being impos-
sible.""2 The desire of both Carranza and Wilson to avoid war pre-
cipitated by border clashes in 1916, and the reappearance of an
East-West issue of greater concern to the United States, the war in
Europe, foretold a peaceful solution.
The constitution that arose from the ashes of the Mexican
Revolution was certain to collide with foreign property interests. It
was, much like the constitutions of many civil and socialist legal
tradition-based nations, less a statement of immediately guaranteed
rights than a platform for future reform. A number of rights con-
tained in that seventy-year-old document are yet to be found in the
fabric of Mexican life. But those rights frightened foreign interests.
During the next twenty-five years, culminating in the expropriation
of petroleum interests, relations focused on the issue of compensa-
tion for damaged or lost property interests. Fortunately for both
nations, some unhappy years between the two World Wars were
opened and closed by U.S. presidents with humanitarian notions
toward Mexico. Wilson's inclination to moderate the protection of
U.S. property with social concern was matched by Roosevelt's simi-
lar expressions in his "Good Neighbor Policy." But as the first
Great War had turned Wilson's head back to the East-West axis,
the Second World War turned Roosevelt's head the same way.
At the close of the Second World War, multilateralism was
thought to be the most certain way to achieve peace and avoid the
protectionist excesses of the 1930s. The United Nations would serve
the former role, the structures created at Bretton Woods the latter.
But multilateralism has not proven to be the total answer to either
peace or economic development. The route to consensus is tortuous,
and when successful it often leaves norms that are so broad that
they allow multiple interpretations. Mexico and the United States
frequently have disagreed as participants in the Bretton Woods or-
12. R. BAKER, 8 WOODROW WILSON. LIFE AND LETTERS 195 (1927).
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ganizations, and they may do so in the forthcoming Uruguay round
of the GATT, to which Mexico sends its delegation for its initiation
as a full member.
For all of the benefits of multilateralism, it may tend to discour-
age effective bilateral relations between neighbors. Bilateralism
then becomes the "threatened consequence" of failed multilateral-
ism. Or it is reserved for resolving disputes rather than for creating
positive economic relations.
Drugs, immigration, or the removal of national patrimony readily
suggest the need for bilateral agreements. The same ought to be
true for regulating trade and investment. If Mexican entry into the
GATT means that U.S.-Mexican trade rules are to be discussed
solely within the confines of the GATT the nations will miss oppor-
tunities to obtain the benefits of adjacency. Those benefits are fully
visible in the European Community, where both small nations and
less developed nations have achieved development with no loss of
national dignity and with nominal relinquishment of sovereignty.
The GATT is unquestionably important to Mexico and the United
States in dealing with the rest of the world. But just as the GATT
has not been the sole tie that has produced economic prosperity
among the EEC nations, the GATT is unable to offer the United
States and, more importantly, Mexico, the maximization of the ef-
fective use of bilateral and multilateral actions.
In this century the United States has begun to deal with Mexico
directly, but the excessive dominance of multilateralism in the post
war years has again turned the United States towards East-West
issues. The special relationship between the United States and
Mexico will not be greatly improved at a bargaining table in Ge-
neva. Bilateral relations have a role which ought not be placed on a
back burner.
We are certainly functioning under the old Spanish curse, "May
you live in interesting times." If interesting is to lend more counte-
nance than curse to the relations of these nations, the North-South
axis must replace the East-West as basic and primordial.
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